21 July 1967.

MEMORANDUM ON THE INTRILLIGENCE PROVINCES OF THE HORSE AND SENATE VERSIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

- 1. (a). The previsions of Section 10% of S. 758 relating to the Central Intelligence Agency are thoroughly asseptable and workship.
- (b) Remove if Section LOS of S. 750 is adopted by the Santage of Section LOS of Sec. 750 is adopted by the Santage of Section 105 (c) of Section 2214. It gives the Mirosine to Market of Section 105 (c) of Section 2214. It gives the Mirosine to Market of Section 25 of Sectin 25 of Section 25 of Section 25 of Section 25 of Section 25 of S
- 2. Section 105 of N.R. 1214 of originally introduced in also thoroughly acceptable and warkable. It is, in fact profession to Section 102 of S. 758. It is to be professed for the following reasons:
- (a) The selary of the Director is placed at \$14,000 which is more in keeping with the relative importance of the position within the national security structure.
- (b) It sutherizes the Director to terminate the employment of any employee.
- (e) It more clearly delineates the functions of the Agency instead of relying on the provisions of the Executive Order of 22 January 1946.
- changed Section 105 (a) of H.R. 4214 to provide that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be selected only from civilian life. Previous versions had provided that the Director be selected from civilian or military life. It is hoped that the Conferess will restore the provision permitting the President to select the Director either from civilian or military life. In this connection, the provisions of 5. 758, attached as Tab "A", or the provisions of H.R. 4214 as originally introduced, attached as Tab "B" herewith, are both thoroughly acceptable. In addition, as an alternative, a possible compremise is submitted as Tab "C", attached hereto.

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the Provision requiring that the Director may be appointed only from civilian life appears to place an unfortunate restriction upon the Presidential powers of appointment. The President should be allowed to exercise his diseretion in appointing the best murilable Mirector, either from civilian or military life, depending upon the qualifications of personnel available at the time of appointment. The necessity of Senate confirmation of the Director would eliminate the possibility of a poor selection; and the Censte in its discretion would probably reject appointers from the armed services if they were continually metated for short tours of daty. If at some time in the future we work plunged into another war, the most qualified appointed night wall be a reserve efficer she had entered on active duty Inch attition life. The proposed restriction would prove the Mar Specialist Such a lightesten would have prevented the appointment of the Director of Strategie Services during the past wer-

5. The main argument advanced in the House of Representetives against a military Director was that the people "are afraid, in this particular instance, over the possibility that there wight be some sort of a Gestage set up in this country. ... I'm might have a military officer she would like to do that; ... if you require a civilian to be the head of this Agency, then you will not have any danger with in the agency of military influence or military dictatorshi ." It is felt that this argument is an excessive interpretation. of the facts. The Agency deals only with foreign intelligence. It would have none of the publicity necessary inc building its Mirector into a public figure of such stature that he might aspire to dictatorship. The Director of Contral Intelligence, heading a small organization, would neve " be in a position to build up that great popular following upon which dictatorship must be predicated.

The New York Herald-Tribune, commenting editorisly of the above quotation, on 21 July 1947, stated that it "reflects the ancient American misunderstanding and suspicion of the military and military affairs, which throughout our listor, has always made sound military policy so difficult for the civil arm." Approved For Release 2002/10/31: CIA-RDP90-00610R000100050024-6

## TAB "A"

3. 758.

ANG. 102. (a) There is hereby established under the Mational Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof, to be appainted from the armed services or free civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of \$12,000 a year.

be appeinted to the office of Director; and his appointment to, acceptance of, and service in, such office shall in no any affect any status, office, rank, or grade he say econy at hold in the armed services, or any enalment, parquisite, fight, privilege, or benefit incident to or trising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such statusion of afficer on the active list shall, while serving in the office of Director, receive the military pay and allowances payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service and shall be paid, from any funds available to defray the expenses of the agency, annual compensation at a rate equal to the securit by which \$12,000 exceeds the assumt of his annual military pay and allowances.

- Sec. 105 (a) There is hereby established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof. The Director shall be appointed by the Projector, by and with the advice and comment of the Senate, from manny the Commissioned officers of the armed services or from manny individuals in civilian life. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 a year.
- services is appointed as Director then
  - in the performance of his duties as irrector, he shall be different to no supervision control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with espect to him if he were a civilian in no way commected with the Department of the Army, the Department of the May, the Department of th
  - (B) he shall not possess or exercise any opervision, control, powers, or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise, as Director) with respect to the armed services or any component thereof, the Department of the army, the Department of the Mavy, or the spartment of the Air Force, or any branch, bureauth or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.
- (2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the appointment to the office of Director of a commissioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of and services in such office, shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any anch status, office, rank, or grade. Any such comstast mes officer shall, while serving in the office of Director, receive the military pay and allorances (active or retired, as the case may be) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service and shall be reid, from any funds available to defray the expenses ; the agency, amount compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which \$14,000 exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowances.

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Sec. 10h (a). There is hereby established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof. The Director may be appointed from the Armed Services or from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The Director shall ressive compensation at the rate of

provided, however, that, if the appointment be made from Armed Services, such appointment had not, so long as he may serve as such Director, be entitled to any status, office, rank or grade he may occupy or hold in the Armed Service or any small-month, perquisite, right, privilege or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank or grade;

Provided, further, that, if a Birector be appointed from the Armed Services, he shall, upon either removal from or relinquishment of such office of Director, be restored to any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services, and shall receive any exclument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade which he would otherwise be entitled to or would be entitled to receive had he remained in the Service instead of accepting the office of Director and acting as such;

Provided, further, that, in the event of the meath of the light, so appointed from the Armed Services, while service in such position, his dependents shall be entitled to such compensat in the benefits as they would have been entitled to had such Director maintained his status in the Armed Services; and

Provided, further, that, in the performance of his duties of Director of Central Intelligence, such appointes shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition. (armed services or otherwise), other than would be operative and respect to him if he were in no way connected with the national military establishment or any component thereof.